TEPHRA: Principled Discovery of Fuzzer Limitations

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ASE'25, Seoul, South Korea, November 16-20, 2025







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Fuzzers are valuable tools because they find **real bugs** in **real-world systems**.







Bug finding is **undecidable**, fuzzers rely on **heuristics**.







In Fact...

0) Design statement

American Fuzzy Lop does its best not to focus on any singular principle of operation and not be a proof-of-concept for any specific theory. The tool can be thought of as a **collection of hacks** that have been **tested in practice**, **found to be surprisingly effective**, and have been implemented in the simplest, most robust way I could think of at the time.

AFL, Michał Zalewski, 2013







What are the limits of current (coverage-guided) fuzzing heuristics?







How do we find those limits?







Unlike formal methods, fuzz testing lacks a fundamental theory.







Unlike formal methods, fuzz testing lacks a fundamental theory.

We rely entirely on empirical observations to evaluate its effectiveness.








Existing empirical methods are based on (benchmark) program suites.


Semantic Space of all possible program behaviors





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









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








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




Piecewise static exploration

of the semantic space.

Existing empirical methods are based on (benchmark) program suites.






Piecewise static exploration

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Existing empirical methods are based on (benchmark) program suites.

- Piecewise static exploration of the semantic space.
- Risk of overfitting/bias.











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


- Risk of overfitting/bias.
- What if my PUT is behaviorally very different?










































Principled Methodology to Empirically Discover Fuzzer Limitations







```
u8 class
struct
bool u16 for
i64 return
4711 while
3.1415 switch
0×FE73 "word"
```

Semantics








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Semantics























































Principled Methodology = Analytical Model + Semantics-guided Program Synthesis










Principled Methodology = Analytical Model + Semantics-guided Program Synthesis










Yields optimistic upper bounds.










Systematically probes the semantic space










Synthesis is *pseudorandom* to *reduce* the risk of *overfitting*.








Obstacle programs are bug-free.









Complements existing fuzzing evaluation methods.





TEPHRA-C/C++


Implementation for C and C++







TEPHRA-C/C++: Synthesizing Obstacles




Synthesized obstacle sample








TEPHRA-C/C++: Synthesizing Obstacles

















26 C/C++ semantic obstacles







26 C/C++ semantic obstacles 31 Fuzzers







26 C/C++ semantic obstacles 31 Fuzzers 37.4 CPU years







Results


| Fuzzer | | | | | | С | hain | | | | | | | Interval 10^x | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|------|--------------|------|------|------|------------|----------|------|------|-------|----|-----|-------|-----------------|----|----|------------|----|----|-----------------|-----|
| | | Unsigned Int | | | | Signed Int | | | | Float | | Cmp | | Unsigned Int | | | Signed Int | | | Float | |
| | bool | 8 | 16 | 32 | 64 | 8 | 16 | 32 | 64 | 32 | 64 | str | mem | 16 | 32 | 64 | 16 | 32 | 64 | 32 | 64 |
| AFL GCC | 15 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 0 | 4 | 14 | -4 | -2 |
| AFL clang-fast | 14 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 0 | 4 | 14 | -4 | -2 |
| AFL libtokencap | 16 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 14 | -4 | -2 |
| AFL QEMU | 32 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 14 | -4 | -1 |
| AFL++ | 15 | 15 | 2 | 64 | 32 | 14 | <u>5</u> | 3 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 12 | -4 | -3 |
| AFL++ CmpLog | 15 | 15 | 0 | 64 | 64 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 64 | 6 | 7 | 64 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 13 | -6 | -15 |
| AFL++ laf-intel | 15 | 13 | 0 | 16 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 11 | $\overline{-2}$ | -1 |
| AFL++ MOpt | 15 | 14 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 14 | <u>5</u> | 3 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 3 | 12 | -4 | -3 |
| AFL++ QEMU CmpLog | 15 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 12 | -6 | -3 |
| AFL++ QEMU CompCov | 16 | 15 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 15 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\overline{-4}$ | -3 |
| AFLGo | 15 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 13 | -4 | -3 |
| Angora | 4096 | 8192 | 4096 | 2048 | 1024 | 8192 | 4096 | 2048 | 1024 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -3 |
| Angora mb | 8192 | 8192 | 4096 | 2048 | 1024 | 8192 | 4096 | 2048 | 1024 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 3 | 13 | -4 | -3 |
| Angora random | 8192 | 8192 | 10 | 0 | 0 | | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 12 | -4 | -3 |
| DARWIN | 512 | 64 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 64 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 3 | 12 | -4 | -4 |
| datAFLow | 14 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 14 | -4 | -3 |
| DDFuzz | 512 | 16 | 2 | 4 | 10 | 32 | 1 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 12 | $\overline{-4}$ | -3 |
| dev-urandom | 13 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 12 | -6 | -4 |
| EcoFuzz | 128 | 14 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 15 | 7 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 6 | -4 | -3 |
| FA-Fuzz | 512 | 14 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 13 | -4 | -3 |
| FairFuzz | 1024 | 128 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 128 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 0 | 4 | 13 | -4 | -3 |
| honggfuzz | 256 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 16 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -1 |
| honggfuzz QEMU | 16 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 1 | | 7 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 8 | -4 | -1 |
| KLEE | 128 | 128 | 64 | 32 | 16 | 128 | 64 | 32 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 128 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ō | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| LibAFL | 16 | 15 | 7 | 3 | 16 | 15 | 7 | 10 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 0 | 2 | 11 | -5 | -5 |
| LibAFL_libFuzzer | 512 | 64 | 5 | 0 | 1024 | 64 | 3 | 1024 | 1024 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -5 | -5 |
| libFuzzer | 512 | 256 | 64 | 16 | 128 | 128 | 32 | 64 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 64 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -4 | -3 |
| libFuzzer Entropic | 512 | 256 | 32 | 16 | 64 | 256 | 32 | 128 | 64 | 0 | Ō | 64 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -5 | -3 |
| Radamsa | 13 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Ō | 0 | 2 | _ | 4 | 13 | _ | 4 | 14 | -4 | _ |
| SymCC | 13 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 0 | Ô | 0 | 16384 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| WingFuzz | 1024 | 256 | 128 | 32 | 128 | 256 | 32 | 256 | 128 | Ö | 0 | 64 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -5 | -3 |







Results: Hunting for



Stable

Behavior


Increasing Complexity








Results: Hunting for **Anomalies**



Stable vs. Unstable Behavior












Results: Performance Differences










Results: Performance Differences










Results: Summary

- All fuzzers struggle with certain semantic constructs.
- Support for rational numbers and character strings lacking.
- Signed integers more difficult than unsigned.
- Overtuning for 32- and 64-bit types, neglecting 8- and 16-bit.
- No fuzzer excels across all obstacles.
- A single obstacle can degrade overall performance.
- ~90% stable obstacle bypasses.
- There are bugs in the fuzzers themselves.







Results: Byproducts

```
clang version 20.1.0
...
PLEASE submit a bug report to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/
and include the crash backtrace, preprocessed source, and associated run script.
Stack dump:
...
1.    bool_chain_exp/tc_8192.c:29661:27: current parser token ')'
2.    bool_chain_exp/tc_8192.c:9:58: parsing function body
'LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput'
3.    bool_chain_exp/tc_8192.c:9:58: in compound statement ('{}')'
clang: error: unable to execute command: Segmentation fault
clang: error: clang frontend command failed due to signal (use -v to see invocation)
```








Summary and Conclusion

Contributions

- **TEPHRA**: *principled methodology* to empirically discover fuzzer limitations.
- **TEPHRA-C/C++**: implementation for C/C++.
- Initial study: counterintuitive limitations found.

Next Steps

- Further experimentation.
- Extend semantics for C/C++.
- Implementation for other PLs.
- Fuzzing based on obstacle profiles.





ucsrl.de/research/tephra

Find us at the poster session!







